Norma Lee Madsen v. Walker Bank & Trust Co:Mpany, A Corporation : Brief of Appellant by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)
1972
Norma Lee Madsen v. Walker Bank & Trust
Co:Mpany, A Corporation : Brief of Appellant
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation






TAJ~LE 0}' CONTENTS 
Page 
STATEl\IEN'f OF THE NATURE 
OF TIIE CASE ............................................ I 
DISPOSITION IN THE LO,VER COURT I 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL ................ 2 
STATEl\IENT Oli' FACTS................................ 2 
ARGUMENT .......................................................... 4 
I. UPON DISHONOR OF THl~ CHECK, 
THE BANK 'iV AS ENTITLED TO RE-
IMBURSEl\IENT FOR TH]~ Al\10UNT 
OF THE CHECK AND PLAINTIFF-
RESPONDENT HAS NO CAUSE OF 
ACTION TO REQUIRE THE 11ANK TO 
REAR THE LOSS ON DISHONOR ........ 4 
II. THE EVIDENCE DID NOT SIIOW 
THAT THE BANK 'VAS NEGLI-
GENT, AND THAT ISSUE SHOULD 
NOT HA VE BEEN SURMITTED TO 
THE JURY. Tl-IE FINDINGS AND 
CONCLUSIONS ON THAT ISSUE 
ARE INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT 
THE JUDGl\IENT ........................................ 9 
III. THE PLAINTIFF -RESPONDENT'S 
O'VN NEGLIGENCE IN FAILING TO 
ENDORSE THE CHECK '1\r AS THE 
PROXIl\IATE CAUSE OF ANY LOSS. 
THE COURT BELO'V Il\IPROPERLY 
REFUSED TO INSTRUCT THE JURY 
ON THE ISSUE OF CONTRIBUTORY 
NEGLIGENCE ................................................ 12 
TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued) 
Page 
CON CL US ION ---------------------·········-------------------------- 18 
CASES CITED 
First Security Bank of Utah, N.A., v. Ezra C. 
Lundahl, Inc., 22 Utah 2d 433, 454 P.2d 886 
( 1969) ----------------------------------------------------------------------
Fox v. Taylor, IO Utah 2d 174, 350 P.2d 154 
( 1960 ---------------------------------------------------------------------·-· 17 
Reese v. Proctor, 26 Utah 2d 219, 487 P.2d 1267 
( 1971) ------------------····------------------------------------------------ 17 
AUTHORITIES CITED 
II. Anderson, Uniform Commercial Code, (1961) 
Restatement of Torts 2d --------------------------------------·· 15 
STATUTES 










8 70A-3-201 ( 3) --------------------------------------------
10 
70A-4-103 ( 3) ------------------------------------------·· 
In The Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
NORMA LEE MADSEN, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
WALKER BANK & TRUST 




BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATElVIENT OF THE NATURE 
OF THE CASE 
This is an action by the Plaintiff-Respondent 
(hereafter called :Miss :Madsen) for damages for negli-
gence in the handling of a $5,500 check payable to Miss 
Madsen and deposited by her without endorsement in 
her savings account with the Defendant-Appellant 
bank (hereafter referred to "the Bank"}. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The case was tried to a jury, and the court submit-
ted one special verdict only for the jury's determina-
tion: "The Defendant, Walker Bank & Trust Com-
2 
pany, was negligent in accepting and in forwarding the 
check in eYidence without any endorsement." The jury 
found the proposition "true." (R. 92). The court found 
that the negligence of the Bank was the sole proximate 
cause of l\Iiss l\Iadsen's loss of the amount of the check 
(R. 126, 127) and awarded .l\Iiss l\Iadsen judgment 
against the Uank in the amount of $5,500.00 plus in· 
terest at 6% from December 5, 1969 and costs. (R.142). 
The Bank's motions for Dismissal or for a Directed 
Verdict; and for Judgment N.O.V. or for a new trial; 
were denied. (R. 53-54, 93-95, 124). 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The Bank seeks a reversal of the judgment of the 
District Court and a holding that recovery of damages 
by l\Iiss l\1adsen is barred by her contributory negli· 
gence in failing to endorse the check and by her war· 
ranties to the Bank upon deposit of the check that she 
would make it good if it was not paid. 
STATEl\IENT OF FACTS 
Sometime prior to l\Iay of 1969, l\Iiss Madsen 
loaned $5,000.00 to one Darrell G. Hafen. (R. 172). 
She tried unsuccessfully to collect the loan for some 
time. ( R. 173, 17 4) . In l\Ia y of 1969 she was given .a 
check for $5,050.00 by l\1r. Hafen drawn on a Virgima 
bank. This check was returned marked "insufficient 
funds" or "account closed." ( R. 173). In September 
3 
of 1969, l\Ir. Hafen gave her a check on a Swiss bank, 
which was returned unpaid twice. (R. 173, 174). On 
December 4, 1969, Mr. Hafen gave Miss l\iadsen a 
check for $5,500.00 drawn on the account of Dixie 
:Minerals and "'\Vater, Inc., at the Draper Bank & Trust 
Co. 11 She had demanded cash; l\fr. Hafen said that if 
the money was in the bank it would be the same, and to 
call the Draper Bank to confirm that money was there. 
l\Iiss l\'fadsen took the check to the Sugarhouse Office 
of "'\¥ alker Bank. She did not endorse the check. She 
deposited a number of other checks, all of which she 
endorsed. (R. 177-183). She gave the Hafen check to 
a teller and asked the teller to telephone the Draper 
Bank to determine if there were sufficient funds in the 
Dixie l\Iinerals account to cover the check. (R. 183-
185). Upon receiving confirmation that sufficient funds 
were in the Draper Bank account, Miss l\Iadsen de-
posited the check to her savings account. (R. 185). The 
check was processed through normal banking channels. 
The check reached the Draper Bank on December 8, 
1969, at which time there was sufficient funds in the 
Dixie l\Iinerals account to cover the check. The Draper 
Bank returned the check for lack of l\Iiss l\iadsen's en-
dorsement. ( R. 94). Walker Bank affixed a substitute 
endorsement on the check ("credited to the account of 
the within named payee") and sent it a second time 
through normal channels to the Draper Bank. Prior to 
the receipt of the check a second time by the Draper 
11 Draper Bank & Trust Co., originally a co-defendant in this 
action, was granted a judgment of dismissal on December 6, 
1971. (R. 56). 
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Bank, the Dixie :Minerals account was attached by thir1 
parties who had commenced a lawsuit against Hafe1 
which resulted in a judgment against Hafen adjudg 
ing that the funds in the Dixi~ _Minerals account ha( 
been obtained by fraud. (R. 94-97). The check was re 
turned to 'V alker Bank, who returned the check to Mis: 
l\ladsen and reversed the credit entry in her savings ac 
count. ( R. 186) . l\Iiss l\ladsen subsequently brough 
suit against the Bank for negligence. She did not brin~ 
any action against l\lr. Hafen to collect the debt, an( 
expressed no intention of doing so. She testified thal 
Mr. Hafen told her that he felt there had been negli· 
gence on the part of the Bank and that his obligatior 
with regard to the debt was fulfilled. (R. 196-197). 
Q. Then, have you filed a lawsuit against 
Darrell G. I-Iafen to collect your 
$5,000.00? 
A. I have not, for the same reason. I feel 
that he did pay me, that he did get the 
money there. (R. 197). 
ARGUl\IENT 
POINT I 
UPON DISIIONOR OF THE CHECK, 
THE BANK WAS ENTITLED TO RE-
Il\IBURSE1\1ENT FOR THE AMOUNT 
OF TI-IE CHECK AND PLAINTIFF-
RESPONDENT HAS NO CAUSE OF 
5 
ACTION TO REQUIRE THE BANK 
TO BEAR THE LOSS ON DISHONOR. 
This action was brought as a negligence action. The 
testimony established that the check was handled in ac-
cordance with standard banking procedure and in 
accordance with the requirements of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code Title 70A, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 
as amended. To establish negligence, l\fiss l\fodsen 
would have to establish that the Bank had not acted in 
accordance with the procedures established by Utah 
statutory law, since the Utah Uniform Commercial 
Code, especially chapters 3 and 4, are a comprehensive 
scheme which sets forth the liabilities and duties of all 
the parties to banking transactions. The court, however, 
refused to instruct the jury on the applicability of the 
Uniform Commercial Code to the case. (R. 78). Under 
the facts of the case, the Code, would al1ow no recovery 
by l\Iiss l\1adsen; to the contrary, the Code, as well as 
pre-code law, specifically provides that under the cir-
cumstances of this case, the Bank had an absolute right 
to take the action it did in charging back the amount 
of the dishonored check to :Miss l\ladsen's savings ac-
count. The Bank's motion to dismiss, citing the Code, 
as well as the Bank's motions for directed verdict, judg-
ment N.O.V. or for a new trial should have been grant-
ed as a matter of law. 
Under Article 4 of the Code, when a check is dis-
honored on presentation to the drawee, (and regardless 
of the cause of dishonor) the customer has the obliga-
6 
tion to make the check good to the bank or other person 
to whom the check is transferred. Utah Code Annotated 
70A-4-207 ( 2) provides in part: 
Each customer ... who transfers an item 
and receives a settlement of other consideration 
for it warrants to his transferee ... that ... In 
addition, each customer ... so transfering an 
item and receiving a settlement or other con 
sideration engages that upon dishonor and any 
necessary notice of dishonor and protest he will 
take up the item. 
The obligation to make good the dishonored check 
a pp lied whether or not the check was endorsed. Utah 
Code Annotated 70A-4-207 ( 3) provides in part: 
The warranties and the engagement to 
honor set forth in the two preceding subsec-
tions arise notwithstanding the absence of en-
dorse1nent or words of guarantee ... 
The Uank has the right to enforce this obligation 
as it did in this case by charging the check back to the 
customer's account. Utah Code Annotated 70A-4-212 
provides in part: 
"If a collecting bank has made provisional 
settlement with its customer for an item and 
itself fails by reason of dishonor, suspension of 
payments by a bank or otherwise to receive a 
7 
settlement for an item which is or becomes 
final, the bank may revoke the settlement given 
by it, charge back the amount of any credit 
given for the item to its customers account, or 
obtain refund ... " 
Utah Code Annotated 70A-4-212 was applied by the 
Utah court in First Security Bank of Utah, N.A. v. 
Ezra C. Lundahl, Inc., 22 Utah 2d 433, 454 P.2d 886 
(1969).21 
Under Article 3 of the Code, the customer, by en-
dorsement, makes a like engagement to pay the amount 
of a dishonored check. Utah Code Annotated 70A-3-414 
provides in part: 
... every endorser engages that upon dishonor 
and any necessary notice of dishonor and pro-
test he will pay the instrument according to 
its tenor at the time of his endorsement to the 
holder ... 
In this case, the Bank, as transferee for value, 
would have the right to compel such endorsement if the 
remedy of chargeback to the account were not available. 
21 The Lundahl case was decided on the fact that the First 
Security had not given timely notice of dishon<?r, an issue 
not raised here. The right of charge-back provided by the 
Code is also provided contractually in th~ Walker Bank ~ass­
book savings agreement, an agreement Miss Madaen adnutted 
familiarity with. (R. 203, exhibit 2P). 
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Utah Code Annotated 70A-3-201 ( 3) provides in part 
... any transfer for value of an instrument not 
then payable to bearer gives the transferee the 
specifically enforceable right to have the un-
qualified endorsement of the transferor ... 
A prime purpose of the Uniform Commercial Codi 
is to provide uniformity and certainty in commercial 
and banking transactions.31 If a society is to have th1 
convenience of a medium of exchange other than cash, 
we must know with absolute certainty precisely whal 
will happen under the various possible circumstance! 
and conditions of using commercial paper. For thii 
reason the Code establishes warranties and undertaking! 
which determine, with certainty, the liability on an in· 
strument at any stage of its negotiation, whatever thi 
reason for a dispute as to liability. Such certainty ii 
necessary, for, in today's high-volume banking, theri 
could be no such thing as payment by check if bankl 
were continually embroiled in la-wsuits, such as this one, 
to determine where the loss should lie for one bad check. 
The Utah Uniform Commercial Code is definite, and 
it is the law of the State of Utah. Under the Code Misi 
:Madsen has suffered no damage, for under Article~ 
on Commercial Paper and Article 4 on Bank Deposits 
and Collections, .Miss :Madsen is liable to the Bank for 
the amount of a check which she deposited to her ac-
3/ See Official Code Comment to Uniform Commercial Code sec· 
tion 4-101, II Anderson, Uniform Commercial Code, P· 6. 
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count and which was later dishonored. The obligation 
of a customer of a bank to make good a dishonored 
check deposited to his account is not, of course, new to 
the Uniform Commercial Code. The effect of the 
action of the court below, however, is to impose upon 
the Bank a duty which has never been imposed upon 
banks either prior or subsequent to the passage of the 
Uniform Commercial Code, the duty to guarantee to 
the customer the performance of the customer's own 
duty in the transaction, that of endorsing the check over 
to the Bank. 
POINT II 
THE EVIDENCE DID NOT SHO'V 
THAT THE BANK WAS NEGLI-
GENT, AND THAT THE ISSUE 
SHOULD NOT HA VE BEEN SUB-
1\UTTED TO THE JURY. THE FIND-
INGS AND CONCLUSIONS ON THAT 
ISSUE ARE INSUFFICIENT TO SUP-
PORT THE JUDGMENT. 
Assuming arguendo that the Utah Uniform Com-
mercial Code did not apply to this case, the Bank would 
still not be liable to :Miss l\Iadsen, for the facts do not 
make out a case of common-law negligence. According 
to Miss :Madsen's own testimony, she endorsed ten to 
fifteen other checks and gave them to the teller who 
gave her a receipt. Then Miss Madsen asked the teller 
to phone the Draper Bank and the teller took the check 
IO 
and went to the next cage and used the telephone there. 
( R. 183, 184). The teller then returned with the checK 
and said that the funds were in the Draper Bank and 
then deposited the amount to l\Iiss l\fadsen's saving~ 
account. ( R. 1 85) . Other testimony established that 
from this point the check would have been picked up 
with others from the tellers cage by a bank messenger, 
delivered to the Bank's computer center where deposi! 
amounts were run and balanced, and then the checx 
would have been forwarded to the Federal Reserve Bank 
for forwarding to the out-of-town payee bank. (R. 109· 
llO). Uncontroverted testimony established that the 
check handling procedures were in accordance witn 
banking regulations, J;-.ederal Reserve Operating Pro-
cedures, clearing-house rules, and the customs ana 
usages of banks in Utah. (R. ll0-1 ll). Such facts are 
insufficient as a matter of law to establish liability for 
negligence.4/ The Bank's motion to dismiss or for a 
directed verdict, made at the close of the Plaintiffi 
case, and re-made at the end of the trial, should have 
been granted for no prima facie showing of negligence 
4/ The common law presumption that compliance with the c~stom 
and usage of the trade constitute the exercise of ordinary 
care is codified with regard to bank procedures in the u(~li 
form Commercial Code. Utah Code Annotated 70A-4-103 
provides in p2.rt: 
Action or inaction approved by this chapt~r or pu~ 
rnant to Federal Rese~ve Regula~ions or operatmg ~ett:be 
·constitutes the exercise of ordmary care and,. rn . 
ab8ence of special instructions, action or ~onaction.t~na 
sistent with clearinghouse ru.les and the hke .or : ter, 
general banking usage not disapproved by this c P 
prima fac-ie constitutes the exercise of due care. 
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-011 the part of the Bank had been made. The submission 
to the jury of the Special Verdict form (R. 92) was 
clearly error. 
Liability for negligence at common law requires 
three elements: 1. A duty owed the plaintiff by the de-
fendant; 2. Negligent performance of that duty by the 
defendant through the lack of the requisite degree of 
care; 3. Damage to the plaintiff proximately caused by 
the negligence.5/ l\Iiss Madsen's case for damages for 
negligence fails at the outset, for the Bank had no duty 
at law to discover her error in not endorsing the check. 
l\Iiss l\Iadsen herself testified that she understood that 
it was her duty to endorse the check, (R. 199-200, 204) 
that she understood that the check could not be nego-
tiated if she did not endorse it, ( R. 200, 204) that she 
understood that if she endorsed the check she promised 
to take it back if it was no good, (R. 205) and that she 
gave the llank no special instructions for handling the 
check. (R. 195-196). In the absence of some special 
undertaking on the part of the Bank, or of some special 
contract with Miss Madsen, the Bank's only duty was 
to use ordinary care in handling the item. There was no 
evidenciary showing that the Bank used other than 
ordinary care in handling the item. The only possible 
time, in the normal handling of the check, for the Bank 
to catch and correct l\iiss :Madsen's error in not endorsing 
5/ The Restatement expresses these three ~leme!lts as (1) an in-
terest protected against unintentional mvas1on, (2) ~onduct 
which is negligent with regard to the person whose mterest 
is protected, and, (3) the conduct is the legal cause of the 
invasion of the interest. 2 Restatement of Torts 2d, I 281. 
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the check was at the teller's cage, before the teller put 
the check into the pick-up box for the hank messenger. 
( R. 271). At the only point in time when the lhnk 
could have caught the error, .l\Iiss :Madsen was still 
standing at the teller's window, able to correct the error 
herself. ( R. 200-20 l) . The proximate cause of Miss 
:Madsen's loss was not the manner in which the Bank 
handled the check, but was her own negligent omission 
in not endorsing the check in the first place. 
POINT Ill 
THE PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT'S 
O'VN NEGLIGENCE INF AILING TO 
ENDORSE THE CHECK 'VAS THE 
PROXIl\lATE CAUSE OF ANY LOSS. 
THE COURT BELOvV IMPROPERLY 
REFUSED TO INS TR U CT THE 
.JURY ON THE ISSUE OF CONTRIB-
UTORY NEGLIGENCE. 
Assuming, arguendo, that a showing of negligence 
on the part of the bank had been made, :Miss Madsen's 
recovery of damages would still be ·barred by her con· 
tributary negligence. There is no question from the 
testimony that Miss l\Iadsen was negligent in deposit· 
ing the check without first endorsing it, and the court 
13 
so concluded.61 Having held that Miss l\Iadsen was 
negligent as a matter of law, the court erred in also 
holding as a matter of law that the negligence of Miss 
l\Iadsen did not proximately contribute to her loss. The 
court apparently applied a "last-clear-chance" theory 
in so concluding. There is no way in which the last-clear-
chance doctrine can be made to fit the facts of this case. 
The last-clear-chance doctrine applies in situations 
where there is an extreme risk of injury to the plain-
tiff and the defendant has the best opportunity to avoid 
the accident. The application of the doctrine requires 
the following elements: ( 1) the negligence of the de-
fendant which brings about a dangerous situation; 
( 2) negligence on the part of the plaintiff which con-
tributes to the dangerous situation; ( 3) recognition on 
the part of the defendant that the situation, from the 
point-of-view of the plaintiff, is out of hand, and that 
only the defendant has a clear opportunity to try and 
avoid the damage, the last-clear-chance; and ( 4) failure 
on the part of the defendant to take that last clear op-
61 The ruling was made in chambers, and dces not, therefore, 
appear in the rE:cord. The ruling is referred to by the court, 
however, in jury instructions number 9. 
The court finds that t:he plaintiff was negligent in 
failing to endorse the check. You will not have to 
deliberate that problem. (R. 85). 
The ruling is also reflected in the fact that the court refused 
to give jury instructions on contributory negligence as a bar 
to recovery. The Bank's exceptions to the court's jury instruc-
tions and objections to the court's not giving instructions on 
contributory negligence or on the application of the Utah 
Uniform Commercial Code are found at R. 276-277. The 
Bank's proposed instructions are found at R. 64-80. The in-
structions which the court did give are found at R. 81-91. 
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portunity to avoid the damage. In the case at bar, none 
of these necessary elements to the application of the 
doctrine are present, except the contributory negligence 
of the plaintiff. The situation which caused the damage, 
the unendorsed check, was not brought about by the 
negligence of the Bank, hut to the contrary was brought 
about by the negligence of .l\Iiss .l\Iadsen. The l3ank 
was not presented with a recognizably out-of-control 
situation which only the Bank could correct. The only 
time when the Bank could have caught the error was 
concurrent in time with the last opportunity lVIiss l\Iad-
sen had to correct the error, that is, at the teller's cage 
when l\Iiss l\I adsen presented the check. 'Vhen the 
Bank was made aware of the situation, that is, when 
the check was returned for an endorsement, the ·Bank 
did act. Tke Bank then supplied a substitute endorse· 
ment and sent the check back through the collection 
process. 
The Utah court has addressed the doctrine of last· 
clear-chance on many occasions, and has quoted with 
approval the analysis of the last-clear-chance doctrine 
expressed in the Restatement of Torts.7 I The Restate· 
ment analysis is found in two sections, § 479 which 
deals with. the situation of the helpless plaintiff, and 
§ 480 which deals with the inattentive plaintiff. Neither 
7 I All of the Utah cases are, of course, personal injury accident 
cases. The application of the doctrine to a -bank check case 
appears without precedent. To consider an unendorsed c~eck 
as a dangerous situation is patently -:>bsured. See espec1ally 
Fox v. Taylor, 10 Utah 2d 174, 350 P.2d 154. 
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section can be made to fit the facts of this case. Section 
479 reads as follows: 
§ 479. Last-Clear-Chance: H e l p less 
Plaintiff 
A plaintiff who has negligently subjected him-
self to a risk of harm from the defendant's 
subsequent negligence may recover for harm 
caused thereby if, immediately preceding the 
harm, 
(a) the plaintiff is unable to avoid it by 
the exercise of reasonable vigilance and care, 
and 
(b) the defendant is negligent in failing 
to utilize with reasonable care and competence 
his then existing opportunity to avoid the 
harm, when he 
(i) knows of the plaintiff's situation 
and realizes or has reason to realize the 
peril involved in it or 
(ii) would discover the situation and 
thus have reason to realize the peril, if he 
were to exercise the vigilance which it is 
then his duty to the plaintiff to exercise. 
2 Restatement of Torts 2d, p. 530. 
The application of § 479 to the facts of the case, 
and the Respondent's theory of the case, reveals that 
16 
the doctrine does not apply. If it is said that l\1iss l\1ad-
sen's negligence in not endorsing the check subjected 
her to risk of harm from the Bank's subsequent negli-
gence in not discovering that l\1iss l\ladsen had failed 
to endorse the check, she still may not recover, for at 
the time and place when the Bank could have discovered 
the error, that is, when the check was presented to the 
teller, l\Iiss l\Iadsen herself could have avoided harm by 
the exercise of reasonable diligence and c are. 
( § 479 (a) ) . Furthermore, even if l\Iiss l\1adsen were 
helpless to avoid the harm, it would have to be estab-
lished that the Bank either knew of her helplessness or 
should have discovered her helplessness and subsequently 
failed to help her. ( § 479 (b) ) . There is no reason under 
the facts for the teller to suppose that l\1iss l\1adsen 
was helpless to endorse the Hafen check when she had, 
a moment before, deposited ten to fifteen other checks 
all properly endorsed. 
A similar application of the facts of the case, to 
§ 480 brings the same result. § 480 reads as follows: 
§ 480. Last-Clear-Chance: Inattentive 
Plaintiff 
A plaintiff who, by the exercise of reasonable 
vigilance, could discover the danger created by 
the defendant's negligence in time to avoid the 
harm to him, can recover if, but only if, the 
defendant 
(a) knows of the plaintiff's situation, and 
(b) realizes or has reason to realize that 
17 
the plaintiff is inattentive and therefore un-
likely to discover his peril in time to avoid the 
harm, and 
( c) thereafter is negligent in failing to 
utilize with reasonable care and competence his 
then existing opportunity to avoid the harm. 
2 Restatement of Torts 2d, p. 535. 
§ 480 cannot apply to this case because the danger was 
created not by the Bank's negligence, but by her O\\"Il 
negligence in not endorsing the check; because the 
Bank did not know that she failed to endorse the check; 
and because the Bank did take action to correct her 
error upon discovering her mistake. 
The latest Utah case in point, Reese v. Proctor, 26 
Utah 2d 219, 487 P.2d 1267 (1971), discusses § 479 
and§ 480 of the Restaternent of Torts in the concurring 
opinion of Justice Crockett, which notes that "We have 
heretofore had occasion to discuss 'last-clear-chance' 
situations and approve the law as summarized in Re-
.11taternent of Torts, §§ 479 and 480." 26 Utah 2d 219 
at 223. The main opinion in Reese v. Proctor succinctly 
states the aspect of the doctrine which applies to this 
case. 
"The last-clear-chance doctrine is applicable 
to a situation where plaintiff's position of ex-
tricable peril has arisen from his own negli-
gence only if the defendant actually knew of 
plaintiff's extricable peril, Fox v. Taylor, 10 
18 
Utah 2d 174, 350 P.2d 154, and cases cited 
therein." 26 Utah 2d 219 at 221. 
In this case, :Miss l\Iadsen's position arose from her 
own negligence in not endorsing the check. There was 
no showing that the Bank had any knowledge that l\iiss 
l\Iadsen had failed to endorse the check until it was re-
turned for lack of l\Iiss l\Iadsen's endorsement. It was 
through no fault of the Bank, furthermore, that the 
maker's account had been attached because of alleged 
fraud; l\fiss l\I adsen, not the Bank, had all of the deal-
ings with the signer of the check. 
CONCLUSION 
In order that checks and other negotiable instru-
ments can be used as a money substitute, a primary pur-
pose of the law of negotiable instruments at common 
law, in prior codifications and in the present Uniform 
Commercial Code has been to provide the certainty in 
banking transactions without which no system of ex-
change can operate. The law is certain, and under that 
law the Bank is not liable to l\fiss :Madsen. l\Iiss l\1ad-
sen's proper remedy is against the maker of the check, 
and that remedy is still available to her. 
It is respectfully submitted that the court erred in 
not granting the Appellant's motion to dismiss or for 
a directed verdict; in refusing to instruct the jury on 
the applicability of the Utah Uniform Commercial 
Code to the case; in refusing to instruct the jury on 
-
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contributory negligence; and in not granting the Ap-
pellant's motion for judgment N.O.V. or for a new 
trial. It is respectfully submitted that the judgment of 
the trial court should be reversed and that this court 
should hold that recovery of damages by Miss Madsen 
from Walker Bank is barred as a matter of law, and 
that the complaint of .Miss .Madsen against Walker 
Bank should be dismissed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
EDWARD J. l\1cDONOUGH of 
Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough 
800 Walker Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 
